

Experienced New Idealism

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The Author

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I. Preconditions

The generation that entered professional and public life around 1900 felt uncomfortable because they did not know where they actually belonged in the given situation and where they should set foot. The group of young people, at least, in whose name I may speak, mostly of petty bourgeois or peasant origin, but striving for the whole, satisfied neither by skat nor by the skittles club, experienced the Reich of the just departed Bismarck as supposedly unshakeable solid ground under their feet and the nation in liberal view as an unloseable prerequisite. But where were we to find a connection? The economic upswing seemed a way to Germany's world position, but the attitude of the capitalists was alarming and repugnant. Personally, these grapes hung too high for us anyway, and advancement through the coercion of the office did not entice us. Social thought was a burning issue for us, but social democracy and massification were an abomination, the whole of Wilhelminism, including the Reichstag, parties and press, was repulsive; the conservatives were wedded to purely agrarian interests, the political centre to the supervisory boards of industry, the left-wing liberals to banking and stock market capital, and all of them were increasingly in bondage to Jewry.

In our worldview, it was the same as in politics. We inwardly resisted materialism and positivism, the associated neo-Kantianism left us empty with its formalism. Theatre, literature, music were also part of it, but what did that have to do with our existence, our goal, our life? Where was our path? In the well-known youth crisis that preceded maturity and finding one's own way, Schopenhauer's ebbing pessimism could hardly captivate us. For many, Nietzsche came up as a saviour in their time of need and has remained so to this day for the old people stuck in their childhood shoes, not a reality of life but also an educated addition, an edification after the tedium of everyday life. In his free hours, the bourgeois prefers to dream himself as a superman and into the will to power: an overcompensated inferiority complex!

That was not the case for me. By chance of the kind that is never chance, I came across the radical left-wing Hegelians of the Vormärz, above all Stirner and Bruno Bauer, the first of whom initially satisfied the needs of my adolescent radicalism. That's why Nietzsche "interested" me, but never moved me inwardly: my radicalism was deeper-seated. Stirner was an episode, Bruno Bauer has become a constantly new experience for me at intervals up to the present. But that radicalism proved to be blind: it was the decomposition of an old world, not the penetration and foreshadowing of a new one.

I was alone and led my inner life without contact with the foreign environment, had hardly any “spiritual” relationships and had never seen the inside of an academic lecture hall, had probably come to the teaching profession out of inner determination, but remained unsatisfied by the profession and never fully fulfilled. As I said, the given ground of this existence seemed unshakeable and not questionable, but what happened on it was unpleasant and not very satisfying. So I took the path that all my peers had to take, who did not sour in mere criticism and desolate in dissatisfaction: I built myself an ideal space above the given reality, a refuge of the pure spirit. The only way to get there was once already paved: recapitulation of the philosophical idealism of the Germans seemed to regain the heights of yore. Therefore, with hard work and sour sweat, day and night, month after month, year after year, I bravely and diligently made my way forwards and backwards through Kant, through Fichte, through Schelling, through Hegel, i.e. from the left-wing Hegelianism of the Vormärz, which had always left me very cool politically, back to the ideological German classicism, to the time of the wars of freedom, to its longings and hopes: to its “realm of the pure spirit”. So I became one of the earliest New Idealists in Germany at a time when Schelling and Hegel did not exist at all in the German consciousness, nor could they be found on the book market, and of Fichte only the so-called “popular” writings. The publishing house Reclam became my first university, since my monthly wage of RM 66.66. was not enough.

I was alone and went down lonely, perhaps abstruse paths, and yet even today I still feel like a representative of a generation, of a rising youth, more than the “youth movement” that was breaking out at the time, which, however, has remained unknown to me and has also become quite old in the meantime.

When historians of philosophy read and wrote about the German idealists at that time, their subject was *res judicata*: a settled matter of a settled past. Just as when philologists today bring up the Germanic belief in fate as an “interesting” but long-dead past. For us, however, idealism has become a bitter necessity of life, a matter of the living present and future. There were many young people at that time who went a similar way, probably not as lonely as I went this way. From the beginning, I differed from all of them in that I felt and knew that *the recapitulation cannot and must not become a restoration*. We have to look back in order to find a new starting point, to go back in order to find a stepping stone to the future, to our own tasks and solutions. I wanted: the thought that the idea must one day intervene in reality in a formative and transformative way, and yet I saw no way to do it, and thus had no real confidence in it. Therefore, the slogan of this half-measure was: culture! Culture as the last and highest, even where folk, social need, Reich, politics were definitely seen and understood: they were

regarded as a prerequisite for culture; I never stuck to the pure concept, to the self-sufficient concept of the idealists! But in culture, as in “education”, there was still half-ness, half “idealism”: half reality, half concept, half attack and half flight from reality into the realm of the pure spirit, thus epigone turn with the longing for reality, for the creative, for the folk, for the moving and shifting history. But did we know what history was? Where did the fates of folks take place? Even if we understood more of history than most Germans around 1800, the idealists, even if we no longer equated events with the concept, we hardly felt the time around 1900 as history itself, or at most as casually rumbling far back in the Balkans or in South Africa. For us, history was something in the past, which had actually ended with 1870 in secularity, if not already with Goethe or with Hegel’s verdict that the world spirit had come to the final conclusion of its dialectical development through history in Hegel’s philosophy. The other was only politics. But what was politics? Wasn’t it the eternally barren treadmill, the gossip of parliaments, parties and journalists, the gears of interests that were banished from good society, from educated conversation, in order to be able to push the heroic tenor X, the actress Y and the hero of the ongoing sensational process Z as an educated backdrop in front of the interests? The battle of interests belonged to the everyday life of the miners, the idealistic education (of the theatre, etc.) to the ladies’ salon. Here, too, the new-idealist epigone realm of the pure spirit found its refuge, its reality. But what did I have to do with the salons and shops?

When, on the morning of 4 August 1914, a fellow teacher at the door of the Mollschule in Mannheim, his face white as ice, explained to me: “Tonight the British have declared war on us, I knew: now reality, history, hardship and task begin for us—now history is present! But what politics is, I had to learn slowly and painstakingly during the war. The wartime with Bethmann, Michaelis, Hertling and the party leaders did not provide any role models in our reality. When, in the summer of 1916, I returned home from the barracks after a short, not exactly heroic service, and threw myself spiritually into the work that for the first time brought thought, reality and creative task closer together, which began the overcoming of epigone-like positivism as well as the victory over the no less epigone-like new idealism, I learned that politics is the shaping of the life of a folk, the history that is given up and becomes, the realisation of a living meaning and the representation of a character. But many an “idealistic” setback had to be overcome later in ever new attempts. The path is called: from ideology to a reality-shaping, future-oriented, folk-shaping image of history. But if the breakthrough was successful at one point, the more certain the setback was at another. That is why so many attempts and pushes were necessary for the final victory.

The document of my new-idealist period is my first work: *Personality and Culture*”, published after six years of work alongside the teaching profession with 28 to 30 hours per week, which was at the same time a study, an autodidactic academic course, immature and unplastic in its formulations, but germinative, containing in terms of its content everything that was to come later, which made further work and historical experience in the monstrous historical period from 1914 to 1940, i.e. up to the book *“Man in History”*, more mature. Only: first it was called programmatically and idealistically *“The Personality in Culture”*, now fundamentally and realistically: *The human being in history*” presupposing *“The human being by nature”* in the book *“Life”*.

It remains a memorable fact, after all, that the young unknown Mannheim elementary school teacher, of whom not a single line had ever been printed before and who had no “connections” whatsoever, was able to make his way into the public eye with a book that remains his most comprehensive to date.

It is a peculiar situation when, after 40 years in the teaching profession and 30 years of public writing, during which time a world has been transformed more radically than youthful radicalism could ever dream of, one proceeds to a self-disclosure of one’s first book and thus to a self-disclosure of one’s career. For once, however, I must emphatically say to the epigone-like retrospective New Idealists who today populate all the chairs of philosophy almost monopolistically, that with my New Idealism from the first decade of this century, whose document is *“Personality and Culture”*, I was not only there before them, but that I did not do as great or as easily with the renewal of idealism as those of today. On the one hand, because I had to relearn everything from myself, painstakingly acquire it and fight for it, without teachers asking me to chew the cud, but on the other hand, because I saw the necessity of overcoming it at the same time as I renewed it, so that we do not get stuck, but come to our own task and solution, to the shaping of reality from the idea, not to an escape from reality through the idea. This is not something I am only adding to the book afterwards, which contains enough sentences that are even more valid today, but it is already emphatically written in the preface of that book. Just as I did not need to be attached to any living teacher, neither did I need to be attached to most of those from the past who had directly become teachers to me—and lastly, neither did I need to be attached to my own first attempts and beginnings. That is precisely why my path in life, although not rigid, has become absolutely straightforward in principle and aim. I have been able to remain as free and independent as I was at that time, beholden to no one, following only inner necessity. In my whole life I have never followed anyone.

For decades I avoided that book because of its bumpy, awkward conceptual and linguistic design, but today I am allowed to bring it up again from my own oblivion, because it is very present in its intention to shape reality in the order of life, the folk and the Reich through the moving thought, even if it is often still ambivalent and unbalanced. The ring closes, even if the year 1940 demands something very different from what the year 1910 could give. That work can very well stand up to the arrogance of today's new idealists, especially from the clan of the late Hegelians. If, however, they today do not regard the schoolmaster who has been appointed to a chair of philosophy as their equal and (e.g. in their books and journals) do not consider him worthy of their attention, this is quite mutual; I have only rejected philosophy itself as an error along with the "philosophers". That is still my necessary radicalism today. From this point, my self-disclosure can proceed to free self-criticism. If the professors are angry with me because the schoolmaster has so ruthlessly disturbed their harmless circles, then, firstly, I openly confess myself to the schoolmaster and, secondly, I can say myself what needs to be said if they believe they should impose their indignant silence on my work. I can break the spell of this silence myself. What happens herewith.

Once, as a nascent New Idealist, I met the laughter or the shrug of the shoulders of others. Now I meet the anger and shrugging of shoulders of the late idealists and Nietzsche epigones, as proof that I am once again a human age full of the most intense experience and the strongest work performance ahead of those who are today almost as far as I was around 1910. The future will prove this just as the present has already proven my approaches of 1910 and my foresight of 1917.

Several times my first manuscript ended up as scraps in the oven—I didn't have a wastepaper basket back then! -I always had to start again from scratch. I also had a hard time with my neighbours. One of them refused, stubbornly and constantly, when I wanted to talk about my secret work, the other was willing, but I saw almost in despair that I couldn't make myself understood, the third said that he had never met a person in his life who thought Hegel was worth reading, apart from the historians who had to take care of the past professionally. He was right, after all. But didn't we have to go through Hegel again in order to really get over him? Through it to get over it, not into it to get stuck in it! Everything from before had to be rehearsed again with the question of what of it was useful, constructive, vital for us. This rehearsal, however, left nothing but ashes, since we needed a new principle, a new approach, in order to be able to fulfil the task set for us by fate, which was fundamentally different from that of 1800.

Young people today may say: Why take this diversion if we have to overcome idealism, if we want to arrive at the thought that can shape reality in man, folk,

race, order of life, Reich and history, because it comes from this reality and not from pure reason? That is, if the concept is not to remain an end in itself? Is not new idealism, with its danger of being stuck, and its backward-looking prophets, then a waste of time and energy? Yes, it is! Oberwunden, however, is only the Oberwinder, the one who has passed through, not the one who has passed by on the outside. With mere negations and short-cuts one gets nowhere, especially not if one is stuck with Nietzsche as the last word in wisdom. It is exactly the same as with Christianity: whoever throws the cap in the air one day and emerges with a "God-command" has not overcome. To overcome means to fight one's way out of a great tradition to a new goal and to prove oneself the victor in this struggle. This is no child's play compared to Kant, Fichte and Hegel! Those who remain stuck in negation, in anti-Semitism, anti-Marxism, anti-liberalism, anti-democratism, are exactly like those who have remained trapped in the spaces they have fought against: both do not advance to new shores, because both, under different auspices, have remained stuck in the same position, in the same conjuncture. Whoever wants to reach the future must have overcome the past, and whoever wants to defeat an opponent must first get to know the opponent very well. Several times I have experienced that young people who started the revolution behind positivism immediately fell into its clutches as soon as they came into closer contact with it. Because they did not want to overcome it themselves, they fell into the grip of the past, became reactionary, because they believed that everything had already existed at that time, which they had sought and not found themselves. Whoever really wants to measure such distances must have passed through them in the struggle itself.

My work has never been in the service of an external purpose. Even in elementary schools, I got no further than noise and unpopularity—"an uncomfortable person!" This is no way to climb the ladder; I have never had such a purpose in mind, but rather my truth and its validity. (There is one exception to this rule: once I aspired to an organisational office; but then a kind fortune saved me from bankruptcy, which would have been inevitable with the fulfilment of my wish). What came positively was brought to me, and I had an inner resistance to some of the things that soured me in the process. As "Personality and Culture" proves, the craft of writing also came hard to me. For a long time I thought I would never be able to master the oral presentation. Even in 1928, after I had been forced to give many lectures in many parts of Germany and had read entire semesters, I did not dare to speak a sentence that had not been formulated before my eyes. After all, with good will, one can do many things that the muses did not give one in the cradle. I even learned patience, which was the most difficult thing for me.

2. Personality and Culture

Philosophical idealism is fundamentally different from what Wolfram von Eschenbach expresses in “Parzifal”:

To strive for the highest

Pledge of happiness

In this life and the next.

This does not necessarily mean high office. Philosophical idealism, too, cannot simply be equated with high aspiration, with service to the idea. Moreover, it has also been a wrong path.

Philosophical idealism bisects the world and man into a rational, high, divine half—the secularised beyond!—and into a natural, lower, inferior, diabolical side. Divine is humanity or reason, also called spirit and absolute, I or absolute consciousness, evil the libidinal, physical, motoric. The universal stands against the real individual, the humane against the brutal, the subject against the object, reason against nature, the spirit against the body, the I against the non-I. The idea can only be a signpost to a goal, never the goal itself; the service of the idea comes to nothing.

In the doctrine of cognition, the object of cognition, the reality of the world, is now to be derived from the rational subject (also called pure reason, general consciousness, absolute spirit, absolute I). With this, cosmology, the doctrine of the reality of the world, is also settled: compared to the concept as the true reality, the real “being” or object, it is reduced to a mere appearance, to a semblance, a half or whole nothing. In dualistic anthropology, the rational ethos, the moral imperative, aims at this: man should organise himself upwards into a pure rational being, into a pure spirit, into a mere ghost, into a universal subject, into a human ego or concept, i.e. complete himself by rejecting everything natural, corporeal, libidinal, volitional, fateful, corporeal as the lower, evil, inferior human side of life. We are to transform ourselves into ideal ghosts, denature ourselves, disembodiment ourselves, yes: de-soul ourselves. For the “spirit” is merely a concept, pure, formal reason! What else could “perfection through spiritualisation” mean? Kant and Lessing once even distilled a myth of the transmigration of souls out of rational and formal spiritualisation. This is the common tendency in Lessing, in Herder (in part!), in Kant, in Schiller, in Fichte and in Hegel: this is idealism in its purest form! Here, the universal concept is regarded as true reality, the pure spirit as the true human being, as the abandoned future human being whose space

of existence will be that realm of the pure spirit above the denied and skipped reality of the world and life. That the human being or the superman places himself out of freedom and out of the same freedom in “unity” in the place of the dead God, as one would like to persuade us of late, was not really demonstrated by anyone at that time, not even by Fichte with the absolute act of the absolute ego. Let us finally carry out the experiment of the superman in reality!

This is not where I wanted to go from the beginning, but to the living, concrete, personal, real human being in his reality of life, in his community existence, in his natural and historical development, in his interrelationships and interpersonal relationships, but above all in his creative achievements, his moving products as the ways of his highest self-revelations, self-presentations and forces of movement in the living I-Thou relationship. I wanted to get to the living folk, to the concrete state and Reich, to history in action, to life in its polarity between nature and history. The guiding theme of my first book, which determines its structure and composition, is therefore: from the subject to the personality, from the object to the general, i.e. to what weaves back and forth between the personalities, what mediates, what constitutes the common, the communal. Finally: from rational statics to historical dynamics by revealing the moving, creative, which emanates from the called personality, which in the work, in fact, takes on objective, mediating form-and thus has a moving, guiding, forming effect on the receiving person.

In short: I wanted to advance from ratio to “life”, to all-life, to community, nature, history, politics, life order, life content, to what I have finally achieved since the “Folkish Political Anthropology” via the stations of the “German State Idea” (1917), through “Revolution der Wissenschaft” (1920), “Philosophie der Erziehung” (1922), “Menschenformung” (1925), “Völkish Gesamtstaat” (1930), “Nationalpolitische Erziehung” (1932) and “Wissenschaft, Weltanschauung, Hochschulreform” (1934). With all this, I wanted to move away from the autonomous concept.

The disreputable Stirner once rendered me an essential service, precisely insofar as he was the last finale in the decomposition of Hegel and thus of idealism in general. Stirner further developed the concept of the universal, human subject into individuality, into the living, concrete, unique, single human being. This became the starting point for my question. Certainly, the spectre of radical individualism with nihilism and solipsism grins behind “the only one” [einzige]. But one does not necessarily have to fall down into this abyss together with one’s world when one comes into contact with Stirner, but should stand on one’s own feet and seek the ground of common reality. In the face of the *I* of the *only one*,

the *you* of the *fellow human being* immediately stands up, which has just as much reality as it brings to bear before the living one. That gives living dynamism. Here a path is pointed to further goals, while Fichte's sovereign and absolute I, which through its "act of action" puts the non-ego out of itself as the epitome of all objectivity and thinghood and at the same time degrades the world to a subordinate, merely formal reality, thus enclosing it in itself, has proved to be an absolute dead end, the true nothing: there nothing remains of world and life reality but an absolute conceptual ghost. Then philosophy becomes the dance of death of such ghosts.

The idealistic subject-object relationship is dead in itself: it begins in the general concept and ends in it. The living I-Thou relationship leads on to the problem of the common, the "general"—once called "culture" by me and culminating in art—and from there necessarily to community as the basis of life for I and Thou, for concrete membership, for events and becoming. Furthermore, the living I-Thou relationship leads to the question of movement, of the events that constantly weave between them, and from there finally to the question of the origin and author of the movement and the events in the living I and in the You. In the last instance, however, this is the question of the creative, the motor in time and history. From now on, "reason", the understanding and mediation between the I and the Thou, speaking and hearing, thus turning to language just as much as to the observation of the reality of things, is only the formal possibility of how I and Thou understand each other, arrange themselves together, how that which comes from within the one, finally the creative, is objectified in language, work and deed, made objective and common or "general", i.e. community. This also includes the concept as one of many ways of understanding, mediating, objectifying, transcending, becoming common.

Why the laborious, misunderstanding diversions via the renewal of idealism, which at the same time had to become an overcoming of idealism? This question is easier asked than answered.

Anyone who could have gone straight for the goal, who could have already identified the final goal, the completion, at the beginning, would be a superman and not a human being who, firstly, has to set his foot somewhere in what he finds, who, secondly, has to go through struggle and toil and error in order to prove himself, in order to truly overcome, not to skip over what he has to leave behind.¹

¹ In the human age from 1800 to 1830, all the elements of our present world view are found in the German Awakening, especially folk, Reich, race, history. Why did no one from there succeed in shaping the corresponding world view? Because idealistic conceptual universalism was overpowering. Nothing helped Freiherr vom Stein

But would not the approach have been closer to the naturalistic positivism that triumphed so powerfully around 1900, proclaiming its own eternity, and would not the path from there to the goal have been shorter, easier and simpler? No! Positivism was alien by origin, at that time already completely sick and barren at its supposed height, hopelessly stupid and dull: another dead end. It was good for technology, but not for the interpretation of the world, not for the shaping of mankind, the folk, the state, not even for the interpretation of nature, let alone for the interpretation of history. Where—outside of technology and the economy—would a formation of will have emanated from?

That is why the path instinctively pointed back to German idealism, rather to the movement of 1813, in order to finish off positivism from here through idealism, but this through itself, through its forward-looking approaches with the help of political-historical experience, the grasping of natural and historical reality. Nothing else was possible. Those who deny this would have had the opportunity to substantiate their opinion through creative action. Getting stuck in new idealism counts for as little as getting stuck in positivism or Nietzsche's epigonism, all of which are useless for building a new world and its world view. All of them are only substitute means of the eternally unfruitful and always latecomers. Every victor, however, has had to experience the revolt of the mediocre behind him. That is part and parcel of the game.

There was a way from the idea to the given and abandoned reality of our folkish-political community life and humanity. From the positivists' point of view, there was and is absolutely no way to get there. One can only advance to the principle of life from what is living, but not from what is dead. But he who remains stuck in new idealism has only taught a substitute for positivism, but otherwise has not overcome anything, and therefore has not created anything. He has only repeated a class. Our future lies with Hegel as little as with Nietzsche or Haeckel, not at all in repetition and regurgitation, but in the breakthrough to a new future—also in worldview and science. But everyone should finally get out of the habit of

against the philosophy of concepts and clouds. Arndt and Jahn did not achieve a victorious breakthrough, but only a run-up; Luden, Rühs and Hasse, who called so loudly for the Reich, did not even penetrate historiography. They were no match for the powers of their present. Fries has splendid views and makes - not from them, but alongside them in weak opposition to Fichte, Schelling and Hegel - his weak philosophy, which was, after all, only a variation on conceptual universalism. Even the armoury of Hamann, Herder and Jacobi did not help. Goethe, however, retreated to his view of nature with a denial of philosophy, history and politics. I only succeeded in breaking through from those approaches of German awakening, because on the other side there were no longer Fichte and Hegel, but thin epigones of New Idealism, which I had also experienced from the ground up. Even here, however, it took thirty years of hard work and struggle. The precursors in the period from 1800 to 1830 are now being worked out.

absolutism. No one can do more than fulfil the task set for them by fate according to their own measure.

In 1909 I had finished the very extensive manuscript of “Personality and Culture”, the thickest of my books, not a single line of which had been intended for publication or had even been printed. What now? I succeeded at the first attempt, and that was one of the few strokes of luck in my life that brought me forward in the work. After some hesitation, the first publisher to whom I offered it accepted the first work of the unknown young elementary school teacher without any aggravating conditions and published it in mid-1910. I still thank Mr Winter of Carl Winter’s Universitätsbuchhandlung in Heidelberg, who died in 1941, for that. If the book, which of course did not bring me any staggering success, had remained in my drawer, it would have become a nightmare and a cramp for me. So I was given freedom for a new approach.

Almost on the same day as the book was published, the Eugen Diederichs publishing house brought out the pamphlet “Die neueste Orthodoxie und das Christusproblem” (The latest orthodoxy and the problem of Christ), with which I assisted A. Drews in his struggle against the theologians, strongly pointing back to the Johannine Christology of idealism. I had been warned. Despite the fact that the writing caused quite a stir, the Baden authorities left the heretical teacher unscathed. My authorities only took notice of my public work when it began to become politically inconvenient for them.

3. Stages of Overcoming

Lessing, Kant, Fichte brought so-called philosophies of history whose last branch always allegedly points to the future. Allegedly, because in truth these conceptual-idealistic constructions have nothing whatsoever to do with real history; their future has remained an unfulfilled and unrealisable ideal demand in the sense of the spiritualisation, dilution, denaturation of human beings, in which human perfection is supposed to consist. In Fichte's "Speeches to the German Nation", however, the reality of the "folk" and thus of history resounds for a moment, but "fades away" just as quickly, because the reality of the folk and of history has absolutely nothing to do with the basic principle of Fichte's philosophy, the absolute or human ego.

In Hegel's philosophy of history, his alleged history, which is in truth conceptual nesting for historical material, an apothecary in dialectical form, fundamentally ends in Hegel's philosophical self-consciousness, in which the history-forming absolute or world-spirit has arrived at itself and thus at its ultimate self-perfection, whereupon it must—like Jehovah—rest in mere being for ever from its becoming, from a work that is nothing other than itself. So there is no future at all. Hegel's philosophy declared the end of the world and of history to have come in the Prussian Restoration, after Hegel had already once been about to set Napoleon, the world soul on horseback, as the last fulfilment of history. Since then, real history has done nothing but refute Hegelian philosophy blow by blow. The Hegelians, however, do not allow themselves to be driven away from their conceptual craft, otherwise they would have sawn off the branch on which they are sitting. What else should they be sitting on?

In 1940 they declare that what this year brought in terms of events and deeds had to come from the constellation and dialectical self-movement of the Hegelian concepts called history. If they had deduced the events of 1940 in advance on the basis of their familiarity with the history-making world spirit in 1920, they would have been justified for all time as bearers of truth, as unveilers of the veiled image of the future. But the deduction of history from behind is, as in the case of the master himself, a swindle, a deception according to the recipe that the rational is the real, but the real is the self-making and self-moving concept.

In "Deutsche Staatsidee" (1917), based on my experience of the World War, I radically destroyed for the first time that philosophy which constructs the world and history from a priori concepts. The conclusion of that book gives a signpost to the coming history—as far as such is possible at all without prophecy—which

was confirmed by the German Revolution of 1933, as Hegel and Hegelians never managed to do.

“Die deutsche Staatsidee” is merely the history of political ideas from German history, i.e. only their reflection in the conscious, reflected ideologies. Philosophy thereby comes fully into its own historically, but only insofar as and to the extent that its ideas have become a history-forming factor through educational, will-forming influence on the German folk. But the ideologists’ claim to replace reality in the folk, the state and history with the concept or even to master it, as Hegel faked it, is dismissed.

In the end, the “Deutsche Staatsidee” itself runs out into an ideology that has sprung from faith, from experiencing the World War and its hardship, from seeing the constant forces, the constants of character in the folk and in history. Ideal constructions of history based on concepts are rejected as nonsensical. The view arising from experience and observation of the living forces in history has in the meantime been proven by the course of history. Where would the late Hegelians have anything even remotely similar to contrast this? This refuted and overcame the idealistic philosophy of history together with its constructions of development, but also the Rickert-Weber doctrine of science of “value freedom”, i.e. the lack of attitude, will, belief and decision-making in science, which prevailed at the time. Max Weber was forced to admit the historical part of this view; he rejected and discarded the allegedly “prophetic” part. In the meantime, the course of history, for its part, has refuted and rejected Max Weber’s science in every one of its points of view and dogmas, just as it has refuted and rejected the Hegelianism of the late Hegelians and the positivist constructions of development. But even today, the majority of science acts as if experienced, present history is none of its business, despite the fact that events are toppling and knocking down their constructions step by step like houses of cards. But this has one advantage: there are always places to build new houses of cards. Against these blows to “being thrown”, all science, together with the latest ontology, saves itself into the void, into pure being, into nothingness—where it belongs and fits. Here, however, there is no longer any need to overcome it: all occupation with it, unless one needs a narcotic for one’s inadequacy before the tasks of life, which could be supplied just as much by alcohol as by conceptual philosophy, is a highly useless waste of energy and time, in contrast to which stone-knocking represents a meritorious social affair. For proof, one need only occasionally glance at the common scientific and philosophical journals: their emptiness usually yawns at the reader from every page.

The unhappy end of the world war washed away the “idea of the state” in the stream of what the post-war period brought in terms of politics, ideas, philosophy and science. The powers and ideas of the post-war period have in turn been washed away by the revolution of 1933; but science and philosophy continue to act as if nothing had happened, as if events were none of their business, as if they, who are after all the children of the last generations, rested on eternal rock outside events. Indeed, he who stands in nothingness and thus in the pure, unmoved, empty concept or being, can be harmed by events as little as he can be harmed by events: this is the heroism of the conceptual nihilists, conceptual ascetics and conceptual acrobats who probably call themselves idealists or ontologists or existentialist philosophers.

“The German idea of the state” was an overcoming, but only in one direction, at one point. When the attack became broader with the following works, the necessity of just as many self-conquests became apparent. The “revolution of science” went against the entire scientific elite of the epigones with a view to new meaning, new goal, new decision. It was at the time when many after the line, such as Meinecke and Litt, confessed that epigonism was now and in the future an inevitable fate, and consoled themselves by saying that one could also be creative in epigonism, since a fundamentally new creation, such as had existed in German idealism, was no longer possible. How did they know that? Why were they allowed to measure the entire German force against themselves? Litt in particular, a chieftain of the late Hegelians, sharply championed the ultimate nature of idealism, hence the inescapability of the present from the epigonism of the late Hegelians. The arrow was aimed primarily at me. Litt is said to have been right. The world view that emerged from struggle and called creation, which corresponds to our nature, our situation and task, stands victorious. However, with the prison of new idealism, it has broken the foundations of philosophical conceptual absolutism in general. It makes no difference whether the world view is new or not new, original or not original: it springs from and corresponds to our folkish task in life and sinks its roots into Germanic blood, Germanic world view, Germanic belief in destiny, thus leaving the conceptual absolutism running from the Greeks to Hegel and the epigones far below it. Insofar as it satisfies our time and our path, it has fulfilled its creative task. We will dispense with the claim to absoluteness: the descendants who need another world view for the sake of another task will know how to help themselves. The philosophy of the past has always promised us the necessary world view, it has always remained stuck in the conceptual elements: it has never reached its goal, the fulfilment of its promise. Once we have gained our guiding principle for life and history, we can blow out that millennia-old will-o’-the-wisp called philosophy without losing any

of its life and cultural value. It has always been an obstacle to political will anyway. New idealists, ontologists and their ilk may die out together with their chairs, just as the positivists have long since died out on the philosophy chairs. If natural science has married itself to death with the dying positivism and offered its infirmities a last asylum, from where the “biological worldview” has been promised to us but not delivered, this aged stranger will not escape its fate either.

Incidentally, it does not matter whether this front of the departing, which I already knew and experienced before it started, mentions or does not mention my name in its books and journals, in its polemics and silent loans. My work will only be in full effect when theirs has long since sunk soundlessly into the orcus. I duly characterised this society as early as 1920 in “*Revolution der Wissenschaft*” (Revolution of Science); in the meantime it has not become any better in kind and attitude. Now it is time to put the stone on its corpse.

New goals, new decisions! The “Revolution of Science” was an anticipated chapter from the “*Philosophy of Education*”, published in 1922, which—carrying on a line of the “German State Idea”—radically overturned conventional pedagogy and, in a struggle lasting about a decade, not only placed the new science of education, the first offspring of the revolution of science, strongly on its young feet, but also led it to a victory in comparison with which the reaction, the uprising of the intellectually underprivileged, has become ridiculous. Through the “philosophy of education”, educational science has also received a scientific or natural-philosophical basis in place of the usual conceptual foundation, in which the race principle appears as the determining factor for growth and education. Without any doubt, the new basis of educational science aims at the principle of all-life. But the heading is still “philosophy”. This is no coincidence: philosophy still points to the idealistic principle of “spirit”. If one examines “Revolution of Science” and “*Philosophy of Education*” for their basic and structural principle, one finds “spirit”, in some cases even hymns to the spirit. The dichotomy between nature and spirit is not really resolved.²

There is no doubt that this is a discrepancy. New idealism is dead; long live new idealism! So the unconquered inner contradiction of “personality and culture” was still present: it was not for nothing that renewed idealism was once made the starting point and springboard of the revolution of science in the first decade of the 20th century: the renewal and the revolution proved in principle to be almost indissolubly linked.

² It is like Paracelsus, in whose “*Liber Meteororum*” we read: “Then the spirit is alive and the life is the spirit, and the life and the spirit work all things, but are one thing and not two”. It goes without saying that here spirit means the formative principle of all life, not consciousness or even intellect.

It is true that “spirit” now no longer means, as it once did, pure reason, absolute consciousness, absolute ego, no longer merely a faculty for the generation and conception of concepts. Apart from understanding and reason, spirit also included the soul in general, will, feeling: a principle of animation. This spirit was certainly not the adversary of the soul; it was still the adversary of matter, the opposite of the object, the disguising of life, tending towards “life” but turning back and buckling before the goal. With “spirit”, in the manner of idealism, the opposition of reason and nature, of soul and matter, can be disguised, denied, but not really abolished. It took more than ten years of work and struggle until even the last push had reached the final goal and the new principle had been won, which is certainly the oldest, the ancestral one for Germanic man. Now the principle of the universe is no longer called spirit, but “life”, which engages spirit and matter, nature and history in itself and generates them from itself. There is no life that does not realise itself through the body, which is why to our Germanic forefathers “lip” meant body and life at once. Spirit” as reason, consciousness, understanding is no longer a principle but a product of life.

With the last decision of this revolution, the company’s nameplate has also necessarily changed. The former “philosophy” has been replaced by the worldview doctrine, just as pedagogy was once replaced by educational science. The worldview doctrine unites the interpretative teaching of the world (cosmology) with the interpretative teaching of the human being (anthropology), consciously and with emphasis on the basic insight gained long before that the human being is existentially a communal being by nature and that science has to take an active part in shaping the human communal existence: Folkish political anthropology” not as one of many possible anthropologies, but as the anthropology demanded and shaped by our single and unified worldview. The principle of life, however, not only permeates and shapes the universe and man, race and personality, matter and spirit, but it unfolds essentially through the polarity of nature and history.

We have many a legacy and burden to carry from idealism and romanticism, bourgeois household goods that have become useless and yet are not easy to get rid of and are no longer suitable for us. Much must be removed so that we can have a clear view, much must be reworked, such as “culture” and “education”, so that it fits the coming time and task.

In the field of new idealism, some have done well to have discovered the “organic”, but “development” belongs to the organic.

The Germans won a victory against the older rationalism penetrating from the West, which saw in all human relationships (state, society, law, etc.)

constructions of purpose, in all natural mechanisms produced by a demiurge, i.e. against the omnipotent “making”, when they recognised and established the world or an area in the world (from 1802 through Treviranus biology, previously called physiology as distinct from physics) as the growing, which “gradually” in imperceptible, continuous transitions unconsciously shapes itself. Such structures were called organisms, and what happened to them was called development. Now, through idealism and romanticism, organic development was also grafted onto “spirit”, from which history, state, society, law, in short all relationships in human community life were to be understood.

This was undoubtedly a deeper insight into the former omnipotence of constructive ratio and mechanics. But the belief in that which happens by itself, that which is best accomplished by itself in silent growth or development, is ultimately quietist, especially in the historical-political sphere: it leads to an apolitical, passive attitude (beyond the realm of bourgeois activity). Do Reichs, states, orders of life, indeed, do folk grow from given natural foundations of their own accord and of their own accord? The Bismarckian Reich grew no more like a wild cherry than did the war of liberation. Where would Germany be if it had simply followed the slogan “let it grow”, i.e. develop organically, since 1918? It would no longer stand at all. Does it all go to metaphysically determined, self-performing and increasing stages of a “development”, a “progress”?

“Organic” once became the anti-revolutionary slogan of conservatives and retrospectivists. One cannot wonder enough how their descendants, whether they were against or for Adolf Hitler’s revolution, believed they should accompany and interpret the deeds of the revolution and the rise of the new Reich with their eternal melody of organic, develop, grow. The well-behaved bourgeois romantics of the organic were just as deaf and blind to reality as the late Hegelians who were closely related to them. They did not live out of reality, but lived out of ancestral theories and valid opinions, precisely bypassing events and reality.

In folkish-political reality, the turn of the times has happened; in world view and theory, it has not. The situation of the sciences, whether they are named after nature or the spirit, is not a hair’s breadth better than in philosophy, which has fallen into nothingness. Is the breakthrough here even more difficult than in state and economy?

I know how difficult it was for me to make a breakthrough at this point and how late it came. The hour for it only became ripe after 1933. It is available in the doctrine of folkish political reality, of the fateful vocation, of the moving act of the creative personality in the works “Völkisch-politische Anthropologie” (1936-38), “Leben” (1939) and “Der Mensch in der Geschichte” (1940). Thus

“development” of every kind, natural and spiritual, is overrun. The onslaught of reaction, on the other hand, only puts the significance of this final push towards a new world view into perspective. In this reaction, positivists (mostly Haeckelian) and new idealists of all kinds joined hands with the pretence that they had all long since possessed and implemented the National Socialist world view. It had grown organically and developmentally among them.

In political circles, as long as they are not themselves attached to positivism or new idealism, the opinion is: “What do we care about theory and ideology? Let their creators die of their stale helplessness and inferiority! The inferiority of these theories cannot be denied. But here lies a danger. In victory Germany will realise that it cannot carry out a world mission without a leading and scientifically elaborated world and guiding concept, i.e. without a scientific and ideological theory. Should the deed and the reality at home be sufficient, we must offer the folk outside a model and guiding principle in this respect as well. Only here will it prove that a revolution endangers itself if it leaves the theory, i.e. the elaboration of the world view, to the forces of reaction. But this theory requires creative action just as much as the Reich. Neither the Reich nor its worldview grow by themselves, i.e. “organically”.

The fateful act of the appointed human being makes history. This realisation, born of experience, is the key to the new view of history, with which the organic growth of the New Idealists and Romantics is just as exalted as the rational making of all mechanists and positivists. Only action leads to theory, just as it leads to historical reality.

The question of the creative and moving in man and history is the guiding principle of my life’s work from “Personality and Culture” (1910) to “Man in History” (1940), i.e. a human age full of the most monstrous fateful events and historical experiences.

When in “Personality and Culture” the question of the creative personality is tackled from the point of view of the subject concept of the new-idealist theory of knowledge and science, two things are implied: firstly, the penetration of recognition into the fully human reality in life and events, and secondly, the need to build a new theory of knowledge and science from the basis of human reality and destiny in community and history. The first goal is achieved in the first and second volumes of “Folkish Political Anthropology”, which are followed by “Life” and “Man in History”. The second goal is fully achieved in the third volume of “Folkish-Political Anthropology”, which contains the radically new theory of knowledge and science. Here reason is placed where it belongs: between nature and fate. Here the concept is founded on and related to the perception of

the real, for the purpose of shaping perception and reality, of mediating both linguistically between the members of the community of life, between I and Thou, between perception and proposition.

All the beginnings of this epistemology are present in “Personality and Culture”, but clearly tangible. The experience of the period between 1910 and 1940 helped in the birth process, made maturation possible and brought about the final decision that detached the beginnings of a new world view from the conceptual shells, constraints and ways of imagining of a used-up past that had in the meantime fallen into ruin in reality as well as in ideology. Even if the shreds of the former ideology still hang around everywhere, covering a different kind of reality, their days are numbered. They will fall down of their own accord, like friable tinder and rotten magic, after history has passed judgement on them.

4. Metaphysics

Several times I have critically ploughed through Kant's "Prolegomena" with my students, sometimes turning over and over every earthworm in it. It could never be decided whether Kant meant his transcendental philosophy only as a critical foundation of a future scientific metaphysics or whether this transcendental philosophy should be the end of the line once and for all instead of any metaphysics. Even if it is subject to many reservations and obscurations, Kant's philosophy still aims—sometimes against its will!—Kant's philosophy nevertheless aims at the shore that Fichte and Hegel then set sail for again with full sails: to set the concept that stems from pure reason, the necessary, apodictic, generally valid concept, as the true and actual reality and, in contrast to it, to reduce the world given to the senses, to perception, to appearance, to second- and third-rate reality, to unreal reality, and thus to reduce the world to a rational formalism. Significantly enough, in his search for an unshakably solid rock that he could take as the foundation of his apodictic transcendental philosophy, Kant finally got stuck on Aristotle's logic—and thus he felt like a Copernican revolutionary!

For Fichte and Hegel there is no stopping them: the concept is true reality; that is the epitome of metaphysics. That is why for Hegel the sensible (conceptual) is equal to reality, that is why Hegel restored the ontological proof of God, the man of the restoration who secretly revived the bastille storm, the enemy of the Reich, the follower of Napoleon, who with his famous method could make anything out of anything and in any case made anything out of it that was just expedient, marketable and opportune every time. That is why the Hegelians today can still carry out any desired adaptation according to this method. Like hedgehogs, they are always "allhü", for they have become all sorts of things in order to make some, above all themselves, happy.

Kant remained ambivalent in every respect. Before he began to transform the universal reality of the world into a conceptual formalism in his critical period, as a radical citizen he clearly adhered to Newton's theorem, which he still regarded as the fundamental theorem of all knowledge of the world even in the "Critique of Judgment": the world is a mechanism. Is that metaphysics or not? Is it metaphysics if I counter: The world is all-living? Both propositions fulfil the striving for a unifying principle of the world, but do not yet seek behind the world, by reducing its reality to appearance, another which they declare to be the true reality. But when Schelling says: the world is all-souled? The last sentence undoubtedly aims beyond the world to a principle standing behind it, separate

from it, a true reality, called soul according to the traditional way, which, even if it is immanent in the world, is nevertheless supposed to represent its motor, creator, meaning. Soul stands against the appearing world reality, life is its principle itself. The first two sentences, on the other hand, do not contain anything of the kind, unless one draws conclusions from the world mechanism to the world mechanic, the demiurge, the watchmaker, the builder of the world.

Metaphysics is rationalised creation myth, even where Kant and Haeckel speak of “natural history of creation”. In the “Critiques” Kant simply left these things in the antinomy. However, they are still metaphysics even if they have to be regarded as “merely formal” ideas, i.e. in the “as-if validity”, insofar as they make statements about whether the world is created or eternal, whether mere causality or freedom prevails in it, etc.

One may allow myth and metaphysics (i.e. rationalised myth) to be hypothetically valid for the purpose of shaping the world picture if one is looking for the unity principle of the world picture, provided one only keeps in mind their hypothetical character. Hypothesis, however, is not faith, but an aid to world knowledge. But metaphysics did not want to be hypothesis, but the actual, last, only, unshakeable truth, the all-valid, exclusive truth of true world reality, even though, like the ecclesiastical dogma of which it was the successor, it changed its skin almost daily, so that in this change nothing remained constant but the change itself.

Here the true nature of metaphysics is revealed: it is a substitute for dogma, but dogma is a substitute for living faith: metaphysics and dogma claim to be a knowledge and recognition of the ultimate truth. Reason, nature, mechanism, life, world, soul, in themselves all native, worldly concepts of the world, immediately become metaphysical concepts when one sets them up as divine or as God and thus fakes a knowledge of God. True faith, however, is not cognition, not knowledge, neither metaphysical nor dogmatic and certainly not hypothetical. Genuine faith is the experience of meaning, the giving of meaning, the judging, the willing, the motor, not the inventory of life, the world, reality. Metaphysics and dogma have “elevated” faith to reason, to knowledge, by overgrowing and suffocating it. Faith makes history; metaphysics has never made history, but wanted to make history stand still, to slow it down, to annul it, to deny it.

Now, in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant speaks the famous words: “I had to abolish knowledge in order to make room for faith”. Strange faith! Since God, freedom and immortality cannot be proven, since these metaphysical ideas of reason do not correspond to any realities, since they have only formal, regulative significance in relation to all reality, I may nevertheless “accept” them for practical use. This is the “as-if” God needed by

those for whom reason as the sole motor (not regulator!) of moral action does not seem to be sufficient, whereby everyone is at liberty to regard pure practical reason itself as God, i.e. as the legislator of the world and of morality. This comes close to the Talmud! The step from the law-giver to the autonomous law, from the world-machine-maker to the self-making world-machine is always small in metaphysics.

The philosophers then called this metaphysics of theirs their religion. Does anyone know what religion is? I do not know to this day. Since I have no need of metaphysics, I obviously have no religion. But I do know what faith is, just as far as I have faith, as far as I am under a must, under a necessity to a goal, which is something essentially different from the formal “categorical imperative”, which, despite its “Act so...”, in reality commands me not at all. All this is mere appearance.

Once I thought I knew what religion was. In my first writings I emphatically called my new idealism my religion, all the more emphatically because my conscience always nagged me that it was all basically just gossip, substitute, embarrassed talk. Today, since I no longer have any new idealism, since I am radically freed from all metaphysics including idealistic theology, natural theology, moral theology, theology of history, philosophy of religion, I consequently no longer have any religion at all. Instead of any substitutes, I have a living faith that is neither metaphysics, nor theology, nor philosophy, but simply faith. Instead of any kind of philosophy, I have gained a German world view, which includes knowledge of the world and of man, of nature and history, everything purely this side and blood-based, everything gained from looking and hearing. However, there is an axis running through the middle of this world view, which is not knowledge but faith, which points to the destiny of my life, but has nothing to do with metaphysics, dogma, “religion” and wants nothing to do with it. That was my greatest overcoming: I got behind philosophy and saw through its inadequacy in every respect.

One can speak of faith as the creative shaper and mover of history in a distanced and objective way, provided one knows about it from experience: one can make it an object of knowledge and research in the historical picture, provided one has understood its historical power in the great bearers of destiny. Faith is not knowledge, but faith can become the object of anthropological and historical knowledge. In contrast, there is no knowledge of God; the bond from man to the living, eternal God is living eternal faith alone.

In philosophy, the concept, comprehension, is always only a means of cognition, a mode of cognition, but not the object of cognition and certainly not the true,

genuine reality in and behind all appearing reality, which fundamental error—the sovereignty, autonomy and self-sufficiency of the concept, also called reason or spirit—is the principle of existence and at the same time the original sin, the hereditary sin of all philosophy since the days of Parmenides and Heraclitus.

Between the approach of nature, the hearing of the fellow human being and faith in God, the concept is merely an aid, an intermediary, a vehicle: the necessary intermediary. But never an existential primacy. That is the end of philosophy.

If I once mistakenly and as a substitute regarded New Idealism as a religion, then at the same time I saw in classical idealism, along with music and poetry, the highest spiritual self-representation of the nature and character of the Germans. Today I can only accept this conditionally, conditionally in so far as one must add: Self-representation of the Germans in the time of Reich-lessness, character crumbling and associated alienation. In the case of music, however, there is not much to deduct, since it is in truth an unsurpassable culmination of the German spirit, somewhat more so in the case of poetry, and most of all in the case of philosophy. Even today, I do not want to deny the German character of philosophical idealism in the way it approaches problems. But one should not want to impose on him afterwards as German self-knowledge and idiosyncrasy even that which he himself does not want to be German, but universalistic. Just as little as Goethe did the political. Universalism and humanism is, after all, his intended and unalterable goal, and the path to it is called: conceptual absolutism, conceptual universalism and conceptual realism, i.e. the replacement of living reality by the concept, the logos, the ratio. The only thing that remains German is the way Lessing, Kant, Fichte and Hegel tread this path. Goethe was at least in one respect considerably more advanced than the philosophers: if he opposed their conceptual universalism with a view of nature and experienced and felt his way of looking at nature, in contrast to the analytical-mechanistic and formalistic way of Newton, Cuvier and comrades, as characteristically German, when the philosophers stood precisely in the line of Cartesius, Newton and comrades, he was also consciously opposed to conceptual speculation.

When I set living reality against conceptual universalism, faith against rationalised religion, world view against metaphysics, life as a principle against being, race as the foundation of nature against humanism, in short: when the entire new idealism evaporated before me, I simultaneously experienced anew and deeply the Germanic foundation and root in all things German, in the folk, the view of nature, the community experience, the way of thinking, the world view, personality, faith, salvation, destiny, creation, art. This strengthened his closeness and love for everything Germanic, for Luther, Dürer, Grunewald,

Paracelsus and for all the Germanic continuity in German history that ran through these men of the sixth century. The will to fight against all foreign infiltration, the fight against all foreigners. The will to resist all alienation, the struggle against the invasion and superimposition of the alien species, made me realise that in the Germanic itself there is a world view that belongs to our species and is more powerful in its approach and direction than the invading alien, universalist philosophy, which has always held back the development of our own. This development of the Germanic world view is possible and necessary today, in a decisive world epoch that is bringing back the Reich as the form of Germanism and as the principle of shaping a world. It is presented in my books “Folkish-Political Anthropology”. Its polarity is further developed in “Life” and “Man in History”. Proof of Germanic continuity is provided in “Volkscharakter und Sendungsbewußtsein, politische Ethik des Reiches”.

Here, too, a ring closes. Although I have never deviated from loyalty to the Germanic and the Reich, I once considered idealism to be the highest manifestation of the Germanic spirit. As a young boy I read whatever came under my fingers. In my environment at the time, that wasn't much apart from a few volumes of *Gartenlaube*.³ But three books, which—apart from the Bible—the so-called “coincidence” brought to me, awakened my inclination and inclination powerfully and permanently: the first Schiller edition, which I found in an attic in my home village and devoured again and again, a popular biography of Luther and the four “splendid volumes” of the illustrated German history of that Swabian democrat and forty-eight-year-old, Zimmermann, whose history of the Peasants' War has long remained popular. From this, not only the Germanic tribes became a passionate and lasting experience for me, with hatred for everything foreign, much intensified since I received a good collection of German sagas as a prize in Sexta. The two Swabians Schiller and Zimmermann also pointed me to that time of German awakening and consciousness of freedom between 1800 and 1830, where I have landed again today, not with idealism, but with that awakening of the German consciousness of kind, folk, Reich and freedom, which was to flow into the fraternity and there, through the fault of the reaction in Prussia, wither away and be pushed back into western waters.

The Greater German Reich fulfils three stations of history anew: the Reich of the great Kaisers, in which Germanic history peaks for the first time, the deed and the call of Luther, the longing of the awakening young Germans from the time of the wars of liberation. This awakened the race and faith, the awareness of nature,

³ Editor's note. Presumably Kriek is referring here to *Die Gartenlaube – Illustriertes Familienblatt* (The Garden Arbor – Illustrated Family Journal). The journal combined essays, short biographies, poetry and current events in an effort to educate and enlighten families.

the world view and the way of thinking, and also the German view of nature, as everyone must recognise when the achievement and political attitude of the German doctors after 1800, who, following Goethe, produced biology as one of the great creations of the Germanic spirit, is properly worked out. There lies the awakening of the Germanic historical consciousness. There is no longer any need for metaphysics in the world view. It is fulfilled in the span between faith and the unified world and universal principle, which is called life and as such assumes its highest form in nature and history, in race, folk and creative personality, and finds its ultimate fulfilment.

5. Educational Science

Even though I became a teacher out of destiny and inclination, I took a genuine aversion to pedagogy with me from the seminary and almost failed it in the “Dienstprüfung” in 1903, just as I failed the organ. May the good old Father Leutz, my seminary headmaster and teacher of pedagogy, forgive me. It was a Pestalozzian tradition, admittedly only of the third rank, but just as stale as the didactic formalism of catechetical schematism. I became a revolutionary in educational science, despite this, not because I was a schoolmaster. In the years after the seminar, I dabbled eagerly in many fields of science, dabbled in many languages, but I avoided pedagogy where it did not exactly step on my toes in a hostile way in professional practice, which I then thoroughly repaid. I never thought much of the theoretical, ideological and technological additions to the teaching craft that called themselves pedagogy.

If one grasps the folk and the state in the natural change of generations and in the historical development, in the self-expression of their essence and in the fulfilment of their meaning, then the problem of education comes into view from a new level just as necessarily as the problem of politics and both prove to be inseparable from each other here. Thus I anticipated and touched upon education in “Personality and Culture”, but took hold of it from the experience of the World War in “German Idea of the State”, built up the new science of education afterwards with “Philosophy of Education”, and made the final breakthrough to political-historical reality with “Human Formation” (1925), “National Political Education” (1932) and “National Socialist Education” (1933).

Nor was this view new. It can be found, albeit in an ideological attitude, in Plato’s philosophy of the state, was consciously practised by the Prussian kings in their formation of the state and was raised to a new level by Freiherr vom Stein.

The teachers’ pedagogy of craftsmanship, born of the Enlightenment and fanned out by conceptual idealism, which since Herbart had basically equated education with teaching, ran almost unrelatedly alongside that state pedagogy. The demolition of the conceptual schematism of pedagogy, which was created by idealism and founded the claim of pedagogy to be a science, albeit a secondary science behind ethics and psychology, once again meant a critical advance and overcoming of idealism. This was done in the introductory chapters of the “Philosophy of Education”: criticism of objectives, individualism, intellectualism, psychologism, evolutionism. Later, the critique of conceptual absolutism and universalism, of the latter’s distance from nature, from the whole

and from history, was added. All this together constitutes idealism, which had to be broken up and eliminated before a real and effective educational science with its own principle could be placed on its own feet and on the solid ground of real life. Today, no one disputes that this has happened emphatically and irrevocably. At the most, one can still pretend not to see even the broadest facts, an art that is practised gladly and often today, but which is quite unfruitful. If those whose profession it is to write something in the blue day were not already plentiful, they would have to be invented so that the printing trade would not become breadless. This is at least as true in the well-established field of pedagogy as in any other. The denial of reality and the suppression of facts cannot remain the task of science in the long run.

One thing neither Plato nor state pedagogy in Prussia managed to do, however, was to grasp education in the context of events, in historical development. This could only be done when the state and politics themselves were completely removed from the ideal construction of natural law and grasped in the context of historical reality. It was not even the World War that helped us to achieve this, but only the National Socialist Revolution, which started with an unprecedented historical consciousness, which did not set its mission in the direction of an overarching ideology, but directed it towards achievable political-historical real goals. Since it reached deeply into the human being himself on the premise that a shaping of life in the sense of the German folk community and a Reich followed by a new order in Europe would not penetrate at all unless a corresponding human being was formed out of the existing racial stock of the German folk, In this revolution, the problem of political leadership was from the outset indissolubly connected with an educational activity which seized all possibilities, i.e. which went beyond the narrow concept of education of conventional pedagogy, and which became the common task both for all the new orders created by the party and for the reorganisation of the already existing forms of community life. And this education of the folk, in turn, could not be separated from racial hygiene, from population and social policy, including the corresponding legislation, and also from the reorganisation of the Wehrmacht and Wehrhaftmachung, all of which measures reached down into the blood and soil, i.e. into the natural foundations of the folk.

Compared to the French Revolution, the National Socialist reorganisation proved to be a far more profound elementary event, which was neither supported nor prepared by the bourgeois intelligentsia. After all, the revolution of educational science, after I had already called for and announced a general “revolution of science” in 1920, can be counted among the few ideological or theoretical-ideological precursors and preparers of the National Socialist revolution, as its

opponents had already recognised early on in the post-World War period. The first steps in this direction were taken in 1917, i.e. in the middle of the World War, with the “German State Idea”, as can hardly be misjudged today. This is no coincidence. For the last part of the “German State Idea” deals with the needs, emergency solutions and necessities that arose during the World War and which are now generally recognised as the real root, the origin of the National Socialist revolution. In the meantime, I have not only called for the revolution of science, but have carried it out in many fields.

The transformation of the science of education is based on a realisation that flatly contradicts the image of man that had prevailed until then under natural law. The conception of man that has dominated the last centuries presupposes a “man in the state of nature”, living in isolation and like an animal, without community, who had once come to the foundation of community together with its accessories (language, state, law, economy, technology, etc.) through the reason inherent in him. All the sciences of the bourgeois age that deal with community life, i.e. political science, law, linguistics, religion, economics, education, rested on this fiction, which contradicted all the human realities that could be discerned from history, ethnology and prehistory. The implementation of the new educational science from this newly won foundation has initiated the general revolution of the sciences. One science after another must follow suit, because none of them can deny the basic insight that man is already a community being by nature, and does not only become one through the application of reason and fictitious understanding. Thus, a radically new image of man, a “völkisch-politische Anthropologie”, is obligatory and prescribed for all sciences of man. With the age of the natural law conception of man, the period of all sciences based on it has come to an end.

However, reference was once made to Natorp and, through him, back to Pestalozzi, who had already made the idea of community the basis of education and educational science. This is wrong for Natorp, for Pestalozzi at least only half right. In Natorp’s teaching, the human being as a community being is given up, but not given by nature. In his approach and starting point, Natorp does not differ in principle from Rousseau, Herbart and the whole of natural law. In terms of experience and practice, Pestalozzi put into practice the idea of the primordial human community; however, as soon as he wanted to give a theory—see his “Inquiries”—he fell into the trajectory of natural law thinking.

For all natural law theory, man originally stands opposite the thing, the natural thing, as a subject in relation to the object. In the bourgeois age, the entire theory of knowledge—including sensory physiology—assumes this once and for all. But

if the human being stands primarily in relation to the human being, the living I in relation to the living you in the community, then with the inclusion of every science of the human being, the theory of knowledge also takes on a completely new face, as I have drawn it in the third volume of “Folkish Political Anthropology”.

For the new educational science, this meant that the functional educational influence from person to person, especially from adults to offspring, which initially works unconsciously, but which is fundamental for everything else, is not only an aid to growth that was invented and fabricated at some time (“hand-holding” even by Pestalozzi), but an indispensable precondition for maturing, the *conditio sine qua non* of membership, without which there would only be care, if not ruin, for the offspring. The same applies to the other vital basic functions of the community; they are of existential importance for humanity and determine our image of humanity together with the sciences based on it.

What is existentially and necessarily given with the human being is not invented by man, thus has no beginning in history, but is the permanent prerequisite of all history. The creation of language, of law, of the political order, of technology, of medicine, of education is not located at any point in time, at a supposedly absolute beginning, but runs through all areas of community life as the moving, determining factor: like revelation, creation is just as present and future as it belonged to the past.

It will be a good while yet before the science that is bobbing behind the revolution, that has sprouted from a sunken age and is committed to it, will have experienced its full reorganisation with the implementation of these principles.

In the teacher training seminar we had once been taught the Herbart-Ziller method and catechetical schematism to the point of overflowing. This pedagogy quickly fell off me like bad plaster, and it didn’t bother me when the school newspapers published a sample catechesis at the top of their pages on Saturdays, so that it would still be warmly applied on Monday mornings at 8 o’clock. I avoided pedagogy in a big way. But beyond that, there was still the actual pedagogical theory or ideology. This thin specter of a concept, mill without grain, husk without kernel, derivative of Herbart, was no less unpalatable to me. It gave teachers the delusion of autonomy and diverted their gaze from the reality of the profession into an ideological haze. How often I experienced angry rebuffs when I asked where and how they did what they called the dignity of their craft: the autonomous ethical goal setting of educating and the psychological method preparation. How hurtful when “the educator” was reminded that he actually had a limited teaching task in an organised school before him, for which the father

state, with a class for one or a few years, put the curriculum into his hand, together with the accessories, i.e. the determination of goals and the directions, for which the state had also prepared him professionally. How degrading, this banal reality in the face of high ideology, which was, however, reserved for edification at the conferences. How indignant the Herbartians were about this desecration of the most sacred pedagogical autonomy and ideology, with which one had once prepared so securely for the exams via Reclam's penny dreadfuls. But nothing changed: the ideology and autonomy remained reserved for the pedagogical Sunday, in everyday life one dutifully ate the catechetical gruel from the idealistic absolutism sauce.

I didn't know then what I still can't and don't want to understand today: that pedagogy only did what every science seems to be obliged to do: to divert our gaze from the reality of life, to cloud and deceive our perception. Doesn't physics still today, in competition with ontology, despite Goethe, carry out the traditional work of destroying nature, of annihilating nature, but in any case of falsifying nature?—About which a strong word will have to be said. I am all the more surprised, in retrospect, that my onslaught, although certainly not without hard struggles, has succeeded in overthrowing that hundred-year-old, multi-layered and multi-storeyed edifice of scientific “pedagogy”, which has become all too weak on a shaky conceptual basis. and replace it with the broad structure of educational science, realistically placed on the folkish-political reality and task. In the field of science, however, some outdated ruins will still have to fall until the revolution of science, as I proclaimed and initiated in 1919, has reached its goal.

Even today, students who are as caught up in exam learning materialism as ever may ask: What is the point of educational science, if it does not provide regulations and instructions for professional practice? The answer: no type of teacher really needs a high level of scientific education for the catechetical drill. The realisation of education as a way of living between nature and history in a folkish-political community is an essential part of the worldview for every fully conscious folk comrade. The teacher, however, who thinks that he does not need a world view and a sense of meaning for his professional activity, is a day labourer like every day labourer in other professions.

6. Politics

One of Merck's words from 1774 left a lasting impression on Goethe: "Your undeviating direction is to give the real a poetic form; the others seek to realise the so-called poetic, the imaginative, and that gives nothing but stupid stuff." If we replace the poetic with conceptual consciousness, that is, with the task of science: to grasp and shape the real through the concept, then I can write this word as a motto and motif for my life's work. I have never been able to come to terms with that philosophy which replaces and displaces the visible real by the concept, which is only an aid to it and even more so to the *thou*, or even to reduce the real to a mere appearance by interpreting it from the concept as the true and actual reality, from which thinking is then identified with being, the rational with the real, which craft is practised today in so-called philosophy just as in so-called natural science.

The sense of the real made me encounter the political and history very early on, even if it was only the experience of the World War that brought about the breakthrough that 1. the political was recognised as the history-forming principle, history thus as present and future, 2. the political and the historical were recognised as reality of the highest order, as the execution of destiny in the primacy of human community life, with the suppression of "culture" and "spirit". Thus idealism and rationalism, like positivism, were overcome in one fell swoop. "Die deutsche Staatsidee" stands on the borderline and forms the high pass.

It was actually the problem of the political that, in the emergence of "Personality and Culture", made it possible to reach out for the concrete, folk-bound human being related to the real you in place of the "absolute I" underlying idealism, the general subject of cognition, which is not a living reality but a transcendental concept hanging in the void. A philosophy whose foundation is a concept will necessarily perform a perpetual idle and round trip in the concept prison like the hyena in the cage. See, for example, "the system" of the dingler ego in natural science.

The creative human being, whom I have been concerned with from the beginning in my philosophising, is not only the genius of poetry, art, science, philosophy, but the Germanic man who carries his right from race and vocation within himself, who therefore at the same time gives measure, direction, value, right to the goal connected with him, by fulfilling what in the community pushes towards light, towards form. This is primarily the fate-bearing hero, the political, history-

forming leader. This realisation matured between the world war and the National Socialist revolution with its total thrust and principle.

How did the farmer's boy from Vögisheim and the son of a petty bourgeois from Müllheim get into politics? The tendency to want to see behind things and processes was inherent, but not a political talent. The political as a question of knowledge inevitably arose from the striving for knowledge of the real, hence the early inclination towards history. For the political, however, an external experience, a reality and a task had to be added, from which the question was awakened.

Growing up in the time of the Bismarck epigone probably brought the never-ending love for the Reich and its creator, but it did not awaken political instinct precisely because there was a feeling of secrecy on the ground of a supposedly unshakeable. The thin national-liberal atmosphere of youth did nothing to change this. The economic rise with its battles of interests was noticed from afar, but did not even seem to have any connection—with the first monthly salary of 66.66 RM. which, by the way, was perceived as trivial. I was too much of an “idealist”. What was written in the newspapers about the Reichstag, monster trials, etc., together with elections and accessories, was received with a mixture of curiosity and contempt. But from my earliest youth onwards, I have never been able to understand what the English actually had ahead of us in terms of greatness, human, military, political or cultural capacity, on which they could base their political supremacy and their imperial claims over us Germans. My sense of history revolted against the English claim to primacy.

I have never been a politician in the true sense of the word, and in particular I have never felt called or qualified to be a political leader, nor have I ever made any claims in this regard. If I became a political fighter and thinker in a way that no one else in academia, at least in my age, did, it was out of a need for the folk and the Reich, i.e. for the highest political goals and supreme political realities, which were fully conscious and brightly awake in me from my earliest youth, from my acquaintance with Schiller and Zimmermann's “History of the German Folk” in the years before my confirmation. Even if my combative work, my political struggles, which never ceased, especially after the World War, were mainly in the field of cultural policy, their meaning was always the same: the one and great German nation, folk and Reich, German future and the German idea in the world. The key to this is that unforgettable word with which the Führer concluded a speech in Hamburg and which spoke to me from the deepest depths of my life: “My only thought, so help me God, is Germany”. I can also claim that for myself.

And yet, for the time from my youth until the World War, I can only say with difficulty, if at all, how it came about, what drove me. I hated party activities from an early age and despised the press. Where was there a bridge or even a necessity to the political for a young, very lonely elementary school teacher, mostly buried in books, with his narrow livelihood? There was no trace of ambitious dreams. My only wish in life was to leave behind something of the rank and nature (if not the direction) of what Schopenhauer had done. This was my destiny, my dream.

Nietzsche's verse about Schopenhauer was on my mind early on:

"Just look at him!

He was nobody's servant!"

But I didn't quite get to grips with this either. Schopenhauer could afford his independence as heir to a considerable fortune; he came from the intellectual atmosphere around Jena and Weimar, was also consciously apolitical, and thus not endangered. Nietzsche, the retired professor from Basel, could fantasise about his books in the valleys of the Engadine and in Italy as the "will to power" and about the superman, and yet he was always anxiously looking back at the "Basler Heerre", wondering whether they would not ultimately take political offence and cut off his pension.

Where was I? Where did I come from? A small elementary school teacher who had never seen the inside of an academic lecture hall, who had no social "background", no wealth, who could be put out on the street with his wife and child any day and who was then no good as a farm labourer, a journalist or any other useful trade. Where would I have found support, a possibility of existence? How did I get the will to freedom, to independence? Headed by my own will? To the ambition of the creative? To political militancy? I do not know. I only know that sometimes I felt like the rider over Lake Constance. But hardly at moments, because I never look back and only now have to force myself to do so, not even reaching for my thick bundles of files and not having most of my battle essays either in my possession or in my memory.

In any case, the political cannot be separated from my work from the very first moment, because it was not something additional to science, but the innermost driving force, often enough I was not even aware of it myself. When a task presented itself to me, I had to reach for it without any consideration, otherwise it would deprive me of sleep and with it my health. This was the only reason why I was able to write fundamental works such as "Philosophie der Erziehung", "Menschenfonnung", "Bildungssysteme der Kulturvölker" during the time when I was in the midst of the most serious political battles, which even led to the

courts, such as the Geck trial—until 1924 still in addition to 28 to 30 school lessons. Today I don't know how it was possible, except that I worked incessantly, had to work, if I was to exist and feel well at all.

The pedagogical and other scientific works are also political. But from around 1927 onwards, the political character emerges clearly and decisively, far more so than in the “Deutschen Staatsidee” of 1917.

Shortly after I had contributed my two political programme essays to Eugen Diederich's anthology on German renewal, which was intended for the “National Assembly” of Weimar (1919), which belong more to the year 1933 than to 1919, I stood at Blauenhöhe—weighing 115 pounds at 1.80 m in length due to suspected tuberculosis—with a heavy, longing gaze towards Alsace and Hartmannsweilerkopf. Then I had a vision: a Greater Alemannic Reichsgau under the leadership of the Baden Alemanni. Today we are close to it. To be read under the title “Heimat Alemannia” in the “Tat” of September of that year.

Several times in those years the Reds and the Blacks contested their electoral agitation against me, or at any rate took their cues from me, especially when I had demanded that the “threatened south-west Mark” be developed into a spiritual bulwark against the western invasion and when I had accused the Centre—together with the governments adhering to it—of separatist high treason against the Reich and its unity. Later on, it was a great disappointment to me that, despite many efforts, I never succeeded in really shedding light on the political role played by the Karlsruhe and Darmstadt governments in the years 1923 to 1924 with regard to the separatist plans. I was completely alone in all this, without any help or support, but also without any consideration. However, I knew that the rulers were not even strong enough to destroy a small elementary school teacher, if he was willing to sit on their backs. This was to prove its worth to the powerful Prussian government from 1931 onwards. In 1932, I should have appointed Mr Grimme as my head of publicity in gratitude for his punitive transfer and expulsion from the civil service.

Since Plato's “Politeia”, there has always been political science, but it usually amounted to political ideology. Never has a political science been so closely committed to reality and the real task as “folkish political anthropology”. This is the real reason for the thorough hatred it has met with in the German scholarly world—and not only among Haeckelians. Today, those who were pushed back in 1933 are back on top in science and academia everywhere: Weimar marches on under “objectivity”. Therefore, since I do not go along with the reaction, the professors cry me out as a “three hundred percent National Socialist”, those very people who know very well that their science is a venal whore, while I, who could

never live independently but was always in hard service, can claim more than Schopenhauer and Nietzsche:

Just look at him!

He was subservient to no one.

If I stand behind the Führer in loyalty, then it is the loyalty of a free Alemanni of peasant blood who sees German destiny and German future embodied in the Führer. If I am loyal to the National Socialist world view, it is because it is a world view of my own blood, to the development and triumph of which I have been able to contribute a great deal through my life's work, ever since the "Deutschen Staatsidee". I would like to see how many German professors, especially among my enemies, can say the same about themselves. With me it was not conformity, but conviction.

While "Personality and Culture" was in print, I was involved by the Mannheim Teachers' Association in its struggles for the once much-famed, now forgotten "Mannheim School System" and was then put in charge of the oppositional "Volksschulwarte". There, in the struggle for school reform—a topic that has continued to the present day and is always equally sterile!—I earned my first cultural-political and polemical spurs. In the Weimar period, I continued this on a broader basis together with my friends Lacroix and Hördt in the "Badische Schulzeitung", partly with, partly against the Badischer Lehrerverein. But since it was not possible to manoeuvre this professional association out of its democratic or Weimar coalition waters, I had to lead the fight against these people from the "Freie Deutsche Schule" (Würzburg), which had passed into my hands, but there too I had an obstacle in the form of the editor, who was reluctant to allow the matter to enter fully into National Socialist waters.

In 1927, by initiating and promoting the great rally of university teachers and by submitting a counter-draft which I had signed by a number of—about two dozen—well-known men of the time, I was able to make a significant push to overthrow the reactionary Keudell's Reich School Law, which wanted to hand over the primary schools to the churches. Since the German Teachers' Association, which was also democratically and social-democratically bound and led, did not quite pull its weight in this matter, there were also vigorous battles with it.

Among the Black-Red-Yellows, from the "Frankfurter Zeitung" to the "Regensburger Anzeiger" and the other Blacks in Bavaria, from the Mannheim "Volksstimme" and the Karlsruhe "Volksfreund" to the Blacks in the Black Forest, at Lake Constance, in Augsburg and Munich, I was not only hated because

of the cultural-political struggle, but also because of the militant engagement against the separatism that had crossed over to the right bank of the Rhine and was supported by the Black-Red-Yellows in Darmstadt, Karlsruhe, etc. I was severely hated for this. I led the fight from the “Gewissen”, from Burte’s “Markgräfler”, occasionally also from the “Mannheimer Generalanzeiger”, from the German nationalist papers in Heidelberg and Karlsruhe, the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” in Stuttgart. However, as soon as it came to opposing the German Nationalists, I was at a loss and at times had only my fortnightly “Freie deutsche Schule” at my disposal. From 1924 to 1928—see the articles by Prelate Schofer in the “Badischer Beobachter” in Karlsruhe of 1928—the Reds and the Blacks repeatedly contested their election agitation in Baden and neighbouring areas against my slogans and essays. Not to forget the articles of the “Frankfurter Zeitung”, which had been very badly disposed towards me since 1918, when I had attempted in the “Tat” to win over the socialists around Lensch and Winnig to nationalism, which led to a serious polemic between the “Frankfurter Zeitung” and the “Glocke”. However, I did not know at the time that its editor Pervus (Helphand) was one of the dirtiest Jew-pushers ever to walk the face of God’s earth. But in the political struggle, you get to the swamps unawares. Thus, because the publishers with whom I had worked until then suddenly closed their doors to me—I had particularly bad experiences with the Hanseatic League on several occasions—I found myself in the most adventurous contexts without knowing it. But in the end I wanted to make an impact on the public with this struggle and I did. So I had to use whatever stepping stones were available. That the black-red-gold people hated me is understandable and serves my pride. Why I found so much opposition from the ranks of alleged National Socialists is more difficult to understand; probably the deepest reason is to be found in the fact that I stuck to the truth even after 1933.

The stepping stones were like that from the beginning. During the war, the “Europäische Staats- und Wirtschaftszeitung” under Jaffe and von Frauendorfer sought to involve me. I used it as a platform in the fight against democracy, for the Prussian electoral law. Around Whitsun 1917, when the “Idea of the State” was published for the infamous first Lauenstein Conference, which Eugen Diederichs then held under the motto “The German Idea of the State”, I had a dramatic meeting with Max Weber as a result of a polemic in the above-mentioned weekly. When I came to Berlin for the first time in the summer holidays of that year to take over the management of the magazine’s domestic politics on a trial basis, I understood for the first time what a disorganised, amateurish, stupid thing politics can be—and was at the time. The mood in Berlin was devastating and disintegrating. I told a colleague at the time, a Baltic who

was to play his precarious role as a newspaper professor in Heidelberg in the post-war period: If Berlin really makes revolution, Southern Germany will march and lay this nest in ruins. I was a bad prophet.

My first article in Berlin was for Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who had just removed Bethmann. On the basis of this article—with a personal declaration of sympathy from the high-ranking officer in question—and with short notice, but necessary for reasons of parity, the magazine was banned by the High Command in the Marches. There I had my lesson in practical politics away. But I understood that this objectivity in politics, as in science, was only feigned weakness.

When I then saw that the political world, starting with my magazine, apparently consisted only of Jews, of breakage and imposture, I retreated back to my Mannheim school at the end of the holidays as a failed candidate and a watered poodle of politics. When I read the armistice conditions on a notice board there in 1918, I cried. But then nothing ever surprised me again, neither Weimar, nor Versailles, nor anything else that came along. Otherwise, I'm not exactly predisposed to tears.

Even at the end of 1918, I brusquely declined an invitation from the director of the “Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung” to join the editorial staff as an editorial writer on domestic politics: an official weathervane was not my taste, especially not at that time. I have all kinds of documents of historical value from that time! From then on, I was protected by a thick hippopotamus skin and could afford all sorts of things in the years to come, of which the Baden governments of the time, and especially my superior ministers of education, knew a thing or two. The fact that they had to listen to everything I said in public under my own name, an official subordinate who stood on his own without any cover, that they could hardly bat an eyelid because they got a rap on the knuckles as soon as they reached for me—that probably most clearly characterises the paucity and fragility of that political system. When, towards the end of 1923, the Social Democratic member of the Reichstag, Geck, tried to hunt down the “pedagogical Hitler figure” through a public slander in the Mannheim “Volksstimme” by his mob, which made fun of itself as “Asl” (Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Lehrer), they suffered a political and moral defeat that was something to be proud of after 11 months of trial, during which Mr. Geck repeatedly hid behind his immunity. So they kept quiet for a while until Prelate Schofer grabbed me in 1928, which forced me to emigrate from Baden. In Prussia, however, I was thrown out of the frying pan into the fire. A few months after the opening of criminal proceedings against me with the aim of dismissing me from my post, the Prussian system government disappeared into oblivion. The damage was not great on either side.

But what does all this have to do with “experienced new idealism”? Well: the Paulskirche was the failed attempt to turn idealism into reality. The post-war system rightly bore the name of the small German town of Weimar, where behind Goethe they always liked to make the little philistines big, as its coat of arms: the Weimar system (Weimar versus Potsdam!) deliberately asked itself to be assigned to New Idealism and Late Humanism. Even if they had only just glimpsed the old man of Weimar from his northern side, like cousin Wassertreter. The constitution and “freedom”: that was the realisation of the new idealism! Both were then, together with the inevitable professors, ideologists and other literary men of the ilk of Mann and comrades. In the universities and in science, the vapid new idealism of the Weimar system still has a stronghold today.

The struggle against Weimar and New Idealism was the inner struggle for the political reality of a great German Reich. In higher education and science, we are still very far from this goal.

In the political struggle, things have sometimes been tough, in some cases without any secularity or reassurance, even to the point of endangering my existence. Today, everything seems a little pale and not very substantial: I have never felt the calling to be a martyr in me any more than I have felt the calling to be a saint or a superhuman. That is why the meaning of this little book is not “Ecce homo” but rather “Homo sum”. But I could write a richly comprehensive and well-documented piece of experienced German cultural politics and cultural history, sometimes from behind the scenes.

7. History

The “Revolution of Science” (1920), with its critique of Alexandrian, earthworm-collecting historicism, proclaims a coming age of elevated, perfected historical consciousness, which could only have been initiated in the 19th century. A historical self-consciousness cannot be separated from a history-forming political will. The Germanic man who is subject to fate knows himself as a historical man, as the responsible bearer of history: that is what distinguishes him from all other men. His world view does not exclude nature: it remains the root and source of life in history, which is determined and driven by fate. The view of nature and the future from the perspective of history gives meaning to all wills and actions in human life, including good and evil, healthy and sick, right and wrong, true and beautiful. This aspect has been fully realised since the “Folkish Political Anthropology” and culminates in “Man in History”, as well as in “Salvation and Power”.

An early inclination for German history, for everything that moves and lifts, for the great men of history, had prepared me sufficiently, even if at first political experience and insight were not yet ripe to grasp and interpret the experience of the World War and the subsequent German Revolution from the depths. This is the origin of the new view of history to crown the worldview, where a new view was opened up from the nature and destiny of man. All rationalism—including idealism—and every kind of positivism have sunk and broken down before it. Reason, however, has regained its rightful place and rank as the organising principle of folkish communal life, of all intercourse among people who stand between nature and fate.

History is the path determined by fate in the

development of the folk. Politics is the steering of the folk along this path, in which the folk are formed into political power and order structures and aligned in their common will. Political leadership is the supreme expression of destiny, which is why it has primacy over the entire community: over education, the economy, the law, the professions, culture, health care, the entire care of the folk. By participating in the controlled life and development of the folk, they take an active and suffering part in history. The “folkish political anthropology”, like the entire National Socialist renewal movement to which it belongs, is rooted in the fateful experience of the World War.

Thus, the personal path goes from the conceptual spinning of philosophical idealism through the experience of German destiny and the reality of events to

the folkish-political image of man, which stretches out in the polarity between nature and history. The first station on this path is the “German State Idea” from the experience of the World War and with the foreshadowing of the Third Reich, while the first work “Personality and Culture”, still caught between idealism and reality, is still fulfilled in culture as the highest value and achievement of the creative human being. The last stations on this path are “Man in History” and “Salvation and Power”.

8. Natural Science

While the work “Man in History” advanced into an empty space and drove out there the ideas of the idealist and Marxist epigones haunting like ghosts and bats.—Ranke and some other historians of the 19th century had actually already broken ground, the Hegelians are no opponents to be taken seriously here in particular, since they prefer to stick to their categories, preferring pseudo-legalistic-formal conceptual games instead of venturing into the reality of history—“Life” has found a closed front of the natural scientists, which, however, is crumbling internally to such an extent that the collapse of this wall is only a question of time. Certainly, the biologists H. St. Chamberlain and Jakob von Uexküll have already done considerable preparatory work in this respect, even if they obstructed their own breakthrough to the victory of their peculiar principle by thinking they could harness Kant to the same yoke as Goethe.

This contrast, as well as the classification of the neovitalists in the good tradition of the German view of nature, was best described by my student W. Eckhard in her excellent dissertation on Chamberlain’s view of nature. I myself was astonished to suddenly find myself in the new path opened up by Chamberlain, which I had not been aware of before, since I had not come into closer contact with Chamberlain for over thirty years. In my early days, however, he had left a strong impression on me⁴, but in the meantime he had receded into the background.

I was able to give the strongest position to the image of nature according to the principle of “all-life” itself when I was able to push back down through positivism and the formalism of physics, which is essentially to be understood as technology, to the bottom of the view of nature and suddenly found myself in one of the strongest and most cohesive German traditions imaginable: the image of nature, on the shaping of which the best Germans from Paracelsus to Goethe and the Romantic philosophy of nature (with some reservations!), above all the best doctors, had worked. It reveals German nature no less than music and poetry, considerably more than formalist philosophy, which was heavily dependent on antiquity and the West, and for which the concept had become the alpha and the omega of the reality of life and of itself. Kant remains right for mathematics, but

⁴ On a higher level, the same astonishment was repeated when W. Eckhard, with her comprehensive work “Deutsche Weltanschauung Im Zeitalter der Romantik” (German World View in the Age of Romanticism), set out to systematically and comprehensively open up the German world view that was newly emerging in the age of 1800-1830 and which had lain unnoticed between the much-treated histories of poetry, philosophy and science (from artztum and biology to history). How burningly “present” you are! Here, too, I found my work surprisingly included and confirmed in the best German tradition.

not for natural science, because he has not seen the reality of nature at all, but has put conceptual formalism in its place and made apriorism, an aid to cultivation, the ground of nature, the true reality.

With his empty space and his action at a distance, Newton was already on the way to dissolving the visible reality of nature into a mathematical conceptual formalism. In this, Kant followed him, and Einstein, in the name of the formal physicists, also drew the last consequence from this. The physicists are doing the same thing here as the ontologists and conceptual realists, whether they pretend to be idealists or positivists. Descartes had at least left the extension of the reality of nature (called substance). With this, one can arrive at a descriptive geometry, at most, if the movement is added to the expansion, at a descriptive kinematics, but never at a dynamics or kinetics. This step was taken by the German Leibniz. Goethe, however, saw in nature the living creative instinct with the constant law of form working through the entire change of form and generation: Goethe found his way back to the all-principle of life, which knows and recognises no dead or mechanical nature at all, but concludes everything mechanical and dynamic as part and function in itself.

In the meantime, mathematical physics, which aspired to become the sole physics and science of nature, has also lost Leibniz's kinetic heritage with the help of the Kant and physics Jews. When H. Hertz demanded the elimination of "force", what Leibniz called the "cause", the moving and animating principle, was also eliminated. Nothing remains of the reality of nature but a complex of conditions that can be reduced to a mathematical formula, to a differential equation: this reality itself is reduced to Newton's empty space. After Hertz had eliminated force from natural science, Heisenberg also removed causality and lawfulness and withdrew to statistics, thus completely throwing Leibniz's kinetic heritage overboard.

But a smart guy from the natural sciences, this time a botanist, counters me: "On our ideas of the structure of matter, highly real actualities are built". Is the reality of plants really built on the ideas of people who like to call themselves botanists, natural scientists? These strange creators of the world take the right to embarrass themselves rather excessively!

But what a lot of people have come together in the defence front against the German view of nature from the so-called natural sciences! All the harmless and mediocre Haeckelians—one could not have imagined before that so many of the dying species, the ape-men, were still alive and kicking!—with the equivalent epigones of positivism, with the formalist relativists and absolutists of physics, with their spirit-seers, with all those for whom technology had turned from a craft

into a world view, with the positivist healing technicians whose craft was “applied natural science”. But even the good neo-vitalists, the half holistic and neo-paracelsists, have retreated, frightened to death, before this “destruction of science”—from the greatest tradition of the German view of nature, to which, apart from Paracelsus and Goethe, Kepler, van Helmont, Sennert, Leibniz, Dippel, Oetinger, then Klelmeyer, Treviranus, Oersted, as well as most of the great German physicians and biologists of Goethe’s time, the front of the smallest and smallest epigones will be formed long before that of the 19th century. Will the front of the smallest and most insignificant epigones be able to stand long before the front of the greatest German naturalists and physicians, which has been deliberately buried since Johann Müller in the 19th century? However, I only realised this connection while working on the book “Life”. I console myself with the fact that the great Cusanus was once accused of “destroying science” by the Heidelberg Rector Wenck von Herrenberg because he broke up sterile scholasticism.

If a geographer were one day to declare the network of lines of geographical longitude and latitude, which is certainly extremely important for orientation but which is only a conceptual aid to reality, to be the true and genuine reality of land and sea, of mountain and river, he would be put into the fool’s house with good reason. Otherwise, however, natural scientists may, indeed must, declare their categories and conceptual aids, their mathematical formulae, their atoms, waves, quanta, quantities and methods of measurement to be the true and only real reality of nature and, in contrast to this, degrade the tangible reality accessible to the senses to a non-existent appearance, to a mere phenomenon.

If one points out this fact, as Goethe once pointed out, one is accused of destroying science, where science for its part is destroying nature, displacing nature, denaturing nature in favour of the concept, at best in favour of technology, machine, laboratory and workshop nature. The physicists, however, are only imitating what the philosophers once did for them, and the biologists, who have also fallen away from the concept of nature, are endeavouring to do the same as the physicists, without actually knowing what for, whereas the physicists can still refer to technical results. Now, however, they have all reached a dead end with this strange procedure and are moaning about the Jews as subversives of physics, where they themselves have failed.

I have made no other claims to natural science than to point out to it the German view of nature as its peculiarly ideological foundation, if it really wanted to become German natural science. This, however, earned me the hatred and hostility of all scientific camps. But it was precisely here that the feeling of having

advanced into an empty space became overpowering. Where is German natural science? A question of price!

When we experience the tremendous events since 1933, a greatest and most profound epoch in world history, with the heroic world decision in the present war, how small and meagre do the men of present-day science, together with their craft, appear in comparison! This science has exactly the dimensions of those who practise it, and these men must once have been looked at for their dimensions! I wonder if they sometimes secretly chide themselves when they rudely stick their little heads in the sand of the science they produce, so that it can act as if the events, the turning point of the world, either do not concern them at all in their lecture halls, writing rooms, institutes, seminars, laboratories, workshops, or only to the extent that individual tasks are set for them from outside to help solve some technical problem. However, they would like to keep the principle and measure of their science outside, so that they can take their epigone dream, the shadow of former greatness, to the grave without being bothered. Their self-importance is nothing but pompous weakness. Even more than in 1920, the sentences that I was compelled to hold against science in the “Revolution of Science” still apply to science.

Yes, fate does not give its favourites everything at once. Where there is such a tremendous use of power and energy on one side, as in the revolution and the turning point of the world, other sides have to struggle and live in poverty until they are called upon. Where much is given, not only much is demanded, but also much is taken. But the spectacle always remains pitiful when equids and bipeds run across the stage in lion skins and make sounds that reveal their true nature more than they conceal it. This science is more miserable than heroic and combative, more retarding than building on a new reality of man and folk, of Reich and future, more an outworn prejudice than a pioneering wisdom, more a nothing than a something. Therefore, the philosophy of the “nothingness” is also quite appropriate to its meaning and nature. Above her it is written: Behold, the feet of those who carry you out are at the door. History will decide between us.

The day will come when science, too, will be called upon and enabled to engage in political, history-forming work. Let us hope that the young people returning from the field of the last assignment and the highest honour will bring with them the sense for the renewal of science and its commitment to the completion of the turning point of time, guided and driven by the German world view that they have lived and experienced.

A new knowledge of the living world, i.e. of nature in man and outside of man, will be the firm foundation, the knowledge of the experienced historical destiny

of the Germans, however, will be the goal and guiding idea of the science of the young German fighters. Then the day of German science in history will come, and the epigones can retire from this history without a sound. No one will sing your praises.

Whoever has lived through the period from the World War to the present with an awake mind and a hot heart will be grateful to fate for being able to experience this tremendous fulfilment, which was never expected to be so close, even with deep faith in the folk and future of Germany. For many of the older generation, the meaning of life has thus been fulfilled in an unheard-of, unimagined way. And what more do we want? A folk that was allowed to fight for and shape what is happening now under a fateful leader cannot fail culturally in the future. The great future will come here too, but it will not come of its own accord. The call goes out to the young to work in the wasteland of science. The world's soil for this has been tilled and sown. The time of maturity is approaching.

In this belief, the loneliness of the old man is not difficult for me. Unsociable loneliness, combined with rare but genuine friendship, has been my destiny from my youth. But this has not turned into a sick loneliness, neither a cramping nor a seduction to superman delusion, because I have always lived in the folk and in living, contemporary history, in which I was allowed to take an active part with my life's work—in the enormous period of German history from 1910 to the great present, even if I had to go my own way, often at variance with the prevailing opinions, or was forced into protest, as I was destined to do by nature and fate. I have always done my duty and remained a free man. Here, too, the saying is fulfilled: What one desires in youth, one has in abundance in old age. That is why I can say yes to good and evil, to sense and nonsense in my life and work.

9. End

This small text was begun in the autumn of 1940 in retrospect of 40 years in the public school service and 30 years of scientific writing. This is a period in which the most outrageous changes have taken place in world history, which science should have corresponded to and has not. Science, in its basic fiction of standing as an absolute on an eternal rock outside of time and events, has, by denying itself the powerful breath of history, only caused its calcification, but not its absoluteness. For my part, I have tried to keep up with what is happening without ever having to adapt or even give up the basic character and principle of the original ideological conception: I have kept in step. The beginnings of the goal we have reached today date back to before the First World War and have matured into self-assurance and self-confidence.

My work during the Second World War has in the meantime found its continuation through several works, all of which further elaborate the basic questions of a kind of Germanic worldview.

“Heil und Kraft” is based on Germanic faith and from there reaches into the basic questions of health, illness and healing, and further into the basic problems of the view of nature.

“Nature and Natural Science” traces the powerful tradition of the German view of nature and natural science in the series Cusanus–Paracelsus–Copernicus–Kepler–Leibniz–Goethe. From this basis, the critical rejection of the prevailing Newtonism takes place, both in its mechanistic and in its formalistic consequences that lead to nihilism.

The “Das Reich als Träger Europas” contrasts the “Deutschen Staatsidee” from the first with the second world war, and shows how the problem of political existence and form has now been posed anew. A new science of politics has emerged with the historical image.

All these works follow the National Socialist revolution and the principle of shaping a new reality of life emphasised by their worldview.

Creative achievements, however, are mostly perceived by official science only as uncomfortable and unfair competition. It does not serve as a recommendation for this science that it alone was able to save itself from a vanished world into a new one and is allowed to behave as if nothing had happened, whereby epigonism has become the measure of all things.

My work has set out the outlines and main directions of an overall scientific world picture from the National Socialist worldview; it has critically separated its principle from everything alien to it and, from its basis, has led the struggle against everything contrary to its essence and against everything that resists it to a decision. The way is clear: the new science stands!

Heidelberg, January 1942